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DESIGN FOR RELIABILITY
PART I--NASA RELIABILITY PREFERRED PRACTICES FOR DESIGN AND TEST
Vincent R. Lalli
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
This tutorial summarizes reliability experience from
both NASA and industry and reflects engineering practic-
es that support current and future civil space programs.
These practices were collected from various NASA field
centers and were reviewed by a committee of senior tech-
nical representatives from the participating centers (mem-
bers are listed at the end). The material for this tutorial
was taken from the publication issued by the NASA Reli-
ability and Maintainability Steering Committee (NASA
Reliability Preferred Practices for Design and Test.
NASA TM-4322, 1991).
Reliability must be an integral part of the systems
engineering process. Although both disciplines must be
weighted equally with other technical and programmatic
demands, the application of sound reliability principles
will be the key to the effectiveness and affordability of
America's space program. Our space programs have
shown that reliability efforts must focus on the design
characteristics that affect the frequency of failure. Herein,
we emphasize that these identified design characteristics
must be controlled by applying conservative engineering
principles.
This tutorialshould be used to assessyour current
reliabilitytechniques,thus promoting an activetechnical
interchange between reliabilityand design engineering
that focuseson the design margins and theirpotential
impact on maintenance and logisticsrequirements.By
applying these practices and guidelines,reliability
organizations throughout NASA and the aerospace
community will continue to contribute to a systems
development processwhich assuresthat
• Operating environments are well defined and
independently verified.
• Design criteria drive a conservative design approach.
• Design weaknesses evident by test or analysis are
identified and tracked.
Vincent R. Lalli has been at NASA Lewis Research
Center since 1963 when he was hired as an aerospace
technologist. Presently, as an adjunct to his work for the
Office of Mission Safety and Assurance in design, anal-
ysis, and failure metrics, he is responsible for product
assurancemanagement and alsoteachescoursesto assist
with NASA's trainingneeds.Mr. Lalligraduated from
Case Western Universitywith a B.S. and an M.S. inelec-
tricalengineering.In 1959 asa researchassistantat Case,
and lateratPicatinnyArsenal,he helped todevelop elec-
tronicfusesand specialdevices.From 1956 to 1963, he
worked at TRW as a design,lead, and group engineer•
Mr. Lalliisa registeredengineerin Ohio and a member
ofEta Kappa Nu, IEEE, IPC, ANSI, and ASME.
1.0 OVERVIEW
1.1 Applicability
The designpracticesthat have contributedto NASA
mission successrepresentthe "besttechnicaladvice" on
reliabilitydesign and testpractices.These practicesare
not requirementsbut ratherproven technicalapproaches
that can enhance system reliability.
This tutorial is divided into two technical sections.
Section II contains reliability practices, including design
criteria, test procedures, and analytical techniques, that
have been successfully applied in previous spaceflight
programs. Section III contains reliability guidelines,
including techniques currently applied to spaceflight
projects, where insufficient information exists to certify
that the technique will contribute to mission success.
1.2 Discussion 2.3 Document Referencing
Experiencefrom NASA's successfulextended-duration
space missions shows that four elements contributeto
high reliability:(I) understanding stressfactorsimposed
on flight hardware by the operating environment;
(2) controllingthe stressfactorsthrough the selectionof
conservativedesign criteria;(3) conducting an appropri-
ate analysistoidentifyand trackhigh stresspointsin the
design {priorto qualificationtestingor flightuse);and
(4) selectingredundancy alternativesto provide the
necessaryfunction(s)should failureoccur.
2.0 RELIABILITY PRACTICES
2.1 Introduction
The reliability design practices presented herein con-
tributed tothe success of previous spaceflight programs.
The information is for use throughout NASA and the
aerospace community to assist in the design and develop-
ment of highly reliable equipment and assemblies. The
practices include recommended analysis procedures,
redundancy considerations, parts selection, environmental
requirements considerations, and test requirements and
procedures.
2.2 Format
The following format is used for reliability practices:
PRACTICE FORMAT DEFINITIONS
Prau:t|co: A brief statement of the practice
BeneJlt: A concise statement of the technical improvement realised
from implementing the practice
Progr4_me _lsat Certified Ue_: Identifiable programs or projects
that have applied the prectlce
Center to Courier for More Information: Source of additional
informat|on_ usually • sponsoring NASA Center (see prigs 6)
implementltiou Method: A brief technical discussion, not intended
to give the full detkile of the process but to provide & design engineer
with adequate information to understand how the pr•ctice should be
ussd
Toclz_ical Igotimaalo: A brief technical juetification for use of the
practice
Impact ofNonpr_tleo: A brief statement of what con be expected if
the practice is avoided
Related Prnctices: Identification of other topic areas in
the manual that contain related inform••ion SPONSOR
OF
Referqmceo: Publications that contain addltlon•l infer- PRACTICE
matlon about the practice
The followingexample of the document numbering
system applicableto thepracticesand guidelinesisaPart
Junction Temperature,_ practicenumber PD-ED-1204:
P D ED 12 04
1. Practice
2. Design Factors
3. Engineering Design
4. Series 12
5.Practice04
Key to nomenclature.--The followingisan explana-
tionof the numbering system:
Position Code
1. G- Guideline
P - Practice
2. D - Design factors
T - Test elements
3° EC - Environmental considerations
ED - Engineering design
AP - Analytical procedures
TE- Test considerations and procedures
4. x Seriesnumber
5. xx Practicenumber within series
2.4 Practices as of January 1993
PD-EC-II01
PD-EC-II02
Environmental Factors
** Meteoroids/Space Debris
PD-ED-1201
PD-ED-1202
PD-ED-1203
PD-ED-1204
PD-ED-1205
PD-ED-1206
PD-ED-1207
EEE Parts Derating
High-VoltagePower Supply Design
and Manufacturing Practices
Class-S Parts in High-Reliability
Applications
Part Junction Temperature
Welding Practicesfor 2219 Alumi-
num and Inconel718
Power Line Filters
Magnetic Design Control for Sci-
ence Instruments
PD-ED-1208
PD-ED-1209
PD-ED-1210
PD-ED-1211
PD-ED-1212
PD-ED-1213
PD-ED-1214
PD-ED-1215.1
PD-ED-1216
PD-ED-1217
PD-ED-1218
PD-ED-1219
PD-ED-1221
PD-ED-1222
PD-AP-1301
PD-AP-13O2
PD-AP-1303
PD-AP-1304
PD-AP-1305
PD-AP-1306
PD-AP-1307
PT-TE-1401
PT-TE-1402
PT-TE-1403
PT-TE-1404
PT-TE--1405
PT-TE-1406
PT-TE-1407
PT-TE--1408
PT-TE-1409
* Static Cryogenic Seals for Launch
Vehicle Applications
** Ammonia-Charged AhminumHeat
Pipes with Extruded Wicks
* Assessment and Control of
ElectricalCharges
* Combination Methods forDeriving
StructuralDesign Loads Consider-
ingVibro-Acoustic,etc.,Responses
* Design and Analysis of Electronic
Circuitsfor Worst-Case Environ-
ments and Part Variations
** Electrical Shielding of Power,
Signal,and Control Cables
** ElectricalGrounding Practicesfor
Aerospace Hardware
** PreliminaryDesign Review
** Active Redundancy
** StructuralLaminate Composites for
Space Applications
** ApplicationofAblativeComposites
to Nozzles for Reusable Solid
Rocket Motors
** Vehicle Integration/Tolerance
Buildup Practices
** Battery Selection Practice for
Aerospace Power Systems
** Magnetic Field Restraints for
SpacecraftSystems and Subsystems
SurfaceCharging and Electrostatic
Discharge Analysis
* Independent Review of Reliability
Analyses
* Part ElectricalStressAnalysis
* Problem/Failure Report Indepen-
dent Review/Approval
* Risk Rating of Problem/Failure
Reports
* Thermal Analysis of Electronic
Assemblies to the PiecePart Level
** Failure Modes, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis {FMECA)
EEE Parts Screening
Thermal Cycling
Thermographic Mapping of PC
Boards
Thermal Test Levels
Powered-On Vibration
SinusoidalVibration
* Assembly Acoustic Tests
* Pyrotechnic Shock
* Thermal Vacuum Versus Thermal
Atmospheric Test of Electronic
Assemblies
PT-TE-1410 *
PT-TE-1411 **
PT-TF_--1412 **
PT-TE-1413 **
PT-TE-1414 **
*New practicesfor
**New practicesfor
Selectionof Spacecraft Materials
and Supporting Vacuum Outgass-
ingData
Heat Sinks for Parts Operated in
Vacuum
Environmental Test Sequencing
Random Vibration Testing
ElectrostaticDischarge (ESD) Test
Practices
January1992.
January1993.
2.5 Typical Reliability Practice
A typicalreliabilitypractice is illustratedin this
section.Environmental factorsarevery important in the
system designsoequipment operatingconditionsmust be
identified.Systems designed to have adequate environ-
mental strengthperform wellin the fieldand satisfyour
customers. Failureto perform a detailedllfe-cyclenvi-
ronment profilecan lead to overlooking environmental
factorswhose effectiscriticalto equipment reliability.
Not includingthesefactorsin the environmental design
criteriaand test program can lead to environment-
induced failuresduring spaceflightoperations.
Environmental Factors
• Practice {PD-EC-1101):Identify equipment operat-
ing conditions.
• Benefit:Adequate environmental strengthisincor-
porated into design.
• Programs That Certified Usage: SERT I and II,
CTS, ACTS, space experiments, launch vehicles, space
power systems, and Space Station Freedom
• Center to Contact for More Information: NASA
Lewis Research Center
• Implement ationMethod: Develop life-cycleenviron-
ment profile.
Describe anticipatedevents from finalfactory
acceptancethrough removal from inventory.
Identifysignificantnatural and induced envi-
ronments foreach event.
Describe environmental and stressconditions:
Narrative
Statistical
• Technical Rationale • Technical Rationale (continued)
_nvJronment
High
temperature
Low
temperature
Low relatlve
humidity
High
pressure
Low pressure
Solar
radiation
Sand and
dust
Salt spray
Principal effects
Thermal aging:
Oxidation
Structural change
Chemlcal reaction
Softening I meliing t and
sublimation
Viscosity reduction/
ovaporitlon
Physical expansion
Increased viscosity and
solidification
Ice formation
]_mbrlttlement
Physical contraction
Moisture absorption
Chemical reaction
Corrosion
Electrolysis
Desiccation
Embrlttlemcnt
Granulation
Compression
Expansion
Outgueing
Reduced dlelcctrlcal
strength of air
Actinic and phyiJo-
chemical reactions:
embrlttlement
Abrasion
Clogging
Chemical reactions:
Corrosion
Electrolysis
Typicalfailurel
induced
Insulation failure;
alteration of elec-
trlcal properties
Structural failure
Lose of lubrication
propertlel
Structural failure;
incraued mechanlcal
stress; Increased
wear on moving parts
Lois of lubrication
properties
Alteration of electrical
properties
Lose of mechanical
strength; cracking;
fracture
Structural failure;
increased wear on
moving parts
Swellings rupture of
container; physical
breakdown; lois of
electrical strength
Lose of mechanical
strength; interference
with function; Ion of
electrical properties;
increased conductiv-
ity of insulators
Loss of mechanical
strength; structural
collapse; alteration
of electrical proper-
ties; aduitlngS
Structural collapeoi
penetration of sial-
log I Interference with
function
Fracture of container;
explosive expansion
Alteration of electrical
properties; Ion of
mechanical strength
Insulation breakdown
and arcoover i corolla
and osone formation
Surface deterioration;
alteration of electri-
cal properties; die-
coloration of mitertlll
olonl formation
Increased wear
Interference wlih func-
tion; alteration of
electrical properties
Increases weir
Lois of mechanical
strength; atteritlon
of electrical proper-
ties; Interference
with function
Surface deterioration;
structural weakening;
increased
conductivity
Environment
Wind
Rain
Temperature
shock
High-speed
particles
(nuclear
irradiation)
Zero gravity
Oione
Exploilve de-
comprolllOn
Acceleration
Principal effects
Force ippllciilon
Depoi|t|on of materials
Heat Isis (low velocity)
Heat gain (high
velocity)
Physical stress
Water absorption and
immersion
]_roslon
Corrosion
Mechenlcal stress
Heating
Tran|mutition and
ionisation
Mechanical stress
Absence Of convection
cooling
Chemical reactions:
Crasing, cracking
Emhrittlcment
Granulation
Reduced dlelectrical
strength of atr
Severe mechtnlcal
stroll
Chemical reactions:
Conttmlnition
Reduced dielectric
strength
Mechanical stress
Typical failures
induced
Structural collapiel
interference with
function; lose of
mechanical strength
Mechanical Inferrer-
once and clogging;
abrasion accelerated
Acceleration of low-
temperature effects
Acceleration of blab-
temperature effect e
Structural collapse
Increase In weigher
electrical failure;
structural weakening
Removal of protective
coatings; structural
weakenlng i surface
deterioration
Enhancement of
chemical reactions
Structural collapse or
weakening; seal
damage
Thermal aging i
oxidation
Alteration of
chemical, physical,
and electrical
properties; produc-
tion of gases and
secondary particles
Interruption of
gravity-dependent
functions
Aggravation of hlgh-
temperature effects
Rapid oxidation;
alteration of elec-
trical properties
Lois of mechanical
strength
Interference with
function
Insulation b reakdown
and arc-over
Rupture and cracking
structural collapse
Alteration of physical
and electrical
properties
Insulation breakdown
and arc-over
Structural collapse
• Technical Rationale (concluded)
Environment
Vibration
Magnetic
fields
Principal effect,
Mechanical stress
_tt|i_i
Induced magnetization
Typical failures
induced
Lose of mechanical
strength; interference
with function;
increased wear
Structural coIllpH
Interference with func-
tion; alteration of
electrical properties;
induced heating
Impact of Nonpractice:
Failure to perform a detailedlife-cycleenviron-
ment profilecan lead to overlooking environ-
mental factors whose effect is criticalto
equipment reliability.If these factors are not
includedinthe environmental designcriteriand
testprogram, environment-induced failuresmay
occur during spaceflightoperations.
References:
Government
I. ReliabilityPrediction of Electronic Equip-
ment. MIL-HDBK-217E Notice I, January
1990.
2. Reliability/Design Thermal Applications.
MIL-HDBK-251, January 1978.
3. Electronic Reliability Design Handbook.
MIL-HDBK-338-1A, October 1088.
4. Environmental Test Methods and Engineering
Guidelines.MIL-STD-810E, July 1989.
Industry
5. Space StationFreedom ElectricPower System
Reliabilityand Maintainability Guidelines
Document. EID-00866, Rocketdyne Division,
Rockwell International,1990.
6. Societyof Automotive Engineers,Reliability,
Maintainability,and SupportabilityGuide-
book, SAE G-11, 1990.
and projects.Unlike a reliabilitydesignpractice,a guide-
linelacksspecificoperationalexperienceor data to vali-
date its contributionto mission success.However, a
guidelinedoescontaininformationthatrepresentscurrent
%eat thinking"on a particularsubject.
3.2 Format
The following format is used for reliability guidelines:
GUIDELINE FORMAT DEFINITIONS
Prwctice: A brief statement of the guideline
Basalt: A concise statement of the technical improvement re.iiued
from Implementing the guideline
Center tn Contact for More Information: Source of additional •
information, usually the sponsoring NASA Center (see p&se 6)
Implementation Method: A brief technical discussion, not intended
to give the full details of the process but to provide a design engineer
with adequate inform.ainu to understand how the guideline should
be used.
Technical Ratlvnale: A brief technical justlfication for use of the
guideline
Impa_'q of Iq[onpractlce: A brief statement of what can be expected if
the guideline is avoided
Related Guidelines: Identlficatlon of other topic areas
in the manual that contain related information _IPONSOR
OP
References: Publications that contain additional GUIDELINE
information about the guideline
3.3 Guidelinesas of January 1993
GD-ED-2201
GD-ED-2202
GD-ED-2203
** Fastener Standardization and Selec-
tion Considerations
** Design Considerations for Selec-
tion of Thick-Film Microelectronic
Circuits
** Design Checklists for Microcircuits
GD-AP-2301 Earth Orbit Environmental Heating
GT-TE-2401 ** EMC Guideline for Payloads, Sub-
systems, and Components
**New Guidelines as of January 1993.
3.0 RELIABILITY DESIGN GUIDELINES
3.1 Introduction
The reliability design guidelines for consideration by
the aerospace community are presented herein. These
guidelines contain information that represents a techni-
cally credible process applied to ongoing NASA programs
3.4 Typical ReliabilityGuideline
A typical reliability guideline is illustrated in this
section. Environmental heating for Earth orbiting systems
is an important design consideration. Designers should
use currently accepted values for the solar constant,
albedo factor, and Earth radiation when calculating the
heat balance of Earth orbiters. These calculations can
accuratelypredictthe thermal environment of orbiting
devices.Failureto use these constantscan resultin an
incomplete thermal analysisand grosslyunderestimated
temperature variationsofthe components.
Analysis of Earth Orbit Environmental Heating
• Guideline (GD-AP-2$01): Use currentlyaccepted
valuesforsolarconstant,albedofactor,and Earth radia-
tionwhen calculatingheatbalanceofEarth orbiters.This
practiceprovidesheatingrateforblackbody casewithout
consideringspectraleffectsor collimation.
• Benefit:Thermal environment oforbitingdevicesis
accuratelypredicted.
• Center to Contact forMore Information:Goddard
• References:
I. Leffler,J.M.: Spacecraft External Heating
Variations in Orbit. AIAA paper 87-1596,
June 1987.
2. Reliability/Design, Thermal Applications.
MIL-lIDBK-251, 1978.
3. Incropera,F.P.; and DeWitt, D.P.: Funda-
mentalsofHeat and Mass Transfer.Second ed.
John Wiley & Sons, 1985.
4.0 NASA RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY
STEERING COMMITTEE
The followingmembers ofthe NASA Reliabilityand
MaintainabilitySteeringCommittee may be contactedfor
more informationabout the practicesand guidelines:
Implementation Method
Solarconstant,W/m 2
Nominal, 1367.5
Winter, 1422.0
Summer, 1318.0
Albedo factor
Nominal, 0.30
Hot, 0.35
Cold, 0.25
- Earth-emitted energy
producing 241 W/m 2)
(nominal, 255 K;
Solar Albedo Earth-emitted Equivslent
constant, factor energy, earth
W/m _ W,/m _ temperature,
K
Nomlntl, 1367.5 0.25 286 _5e
.30 239 254
.$5 222 280
Winter solstice, O.g8 257 263
1422 .30 249 2];8
.SS 231 283
Summer so]stics, 0.28 24T 256
131S .50 231 251
.S& 214 246
• Technical Rationale:Modificationof energy inci-
dent on a spacecraftdue toEarth-Sun distancevariation
and accuracy ofsolarconstantareofsufficientmagnitude
to be important parameters in performing a thermal
analysis.
• Impact of Nonpractice:Failure to use constants
resultsin an incomplete thermal analysisand grossly
underestimated temperature variationsofcomponents.
Dan Lee
Ames ResearchCenter
MS 218-7DQR
MoffettField,California94035
JackRemez
Goddard SpaceFlightCenter
Bldg.6 Rm $233 Code 302
Greenbelt,Maryland 20771
Thomas Gindoff
JetPropulsionLaboratory
CaliforniaInstituteofTechnology
MS 301-456SEC 521
4800 Oak Grove Drive
Pasadena,California91109
Nancy Steisslinger
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Bldg.45 Run 613 Code NB23
Houston,Texas 77058
Leon M]gdalski
John F.Kennedy Space Center
RT-ENG-2 KSC HQS 3548
Kennedy Space Center,Florida32899
SalvatoreBavuso
LangleyResearchCenter
MS 478
5 Freeman Road
Hampton, Virginia 23665-5225
VincentLalli
Lewis ResearchCenter
MS 501-4 Code 0152
21000BrookparkRoad
Cleveland,Ohio 44135
DonaldBush
GeorgeC. MarshallSpaceFlightCenter
CT11 Bldg.4103
MarshallSpace FlightCenter,Alabama 35812
Ronald Lisk
NASA HeadquartersCode QS
Washington,DC 20546
PART H--RELIABILITY TRAINING
1.0 INTRODUCTION TO RELIABILITY
=Reliability_ appliesto systems consistingofpeople,
machines, and writteninformation.A system isreliable
ifthosewho need itcan depend on itover a reasonable
periodoftime and ifitsatisfiestheirneeds.Of the people
involved in a system,some relyon it,some keep itreli-
able,and some do both. Severalmachines comprise a sys-
tem: mechanical,electrical,and electronic.The written
information definespeoples'roles in the system: sales
literature;system specifications;detailedmanufacturing
drawings;software,programs, and procedures;operating
and repairinstructions;and inventory control.
Reliabilityengineeringisthe discipline that defines
specifictasks done while a system is being planned,
designed,manufactured, used, and improved. Outside of
the usualengineeringand management tasks,thesetasks
ensure that the people in the system attend to allthose
detailsthat keep itoperatingreliably.
Reliabilityengineeringisnecessarybecauseasusersof
rapidly changing technology and as members of large
complex systems,we cannot ensurethat essentialdetails
affectingreliabilityare not overlooked.
I.I Period of Awakening: FailureAnalysis
The theme ofthistutorialisfailurephysics:the study
of how products,hardware, software, and systems fail
and what can be done about it.Training in reliability
must begin with a review ofmathematics and a descrip-
tion of the elements that contributeto product failures.
Consider the followingexample of a failureanalysis.A
semiconductor diode developed a short.Analysisshowed
thata surgevoltagewas occurringoccasionally,exceeding
the breakdown voltageof the diode and burning itup.
The problem: stressexceeding strength,a type I failure.
A transistorsuddenly stopped functioning.Analysis
showed that aluminum metallizationopened at an oxide
step on the chip,the opening acceleratedby the neck-
down ofthe metallizationat the step.In classicaltermi-
nology,thisfailure,caused by a manufacturing flaw,isa
random failure(type If).These two failuretypes are
shown infigure1.Formerly, most of the designcontrol
effortshown in the figurewere aimed at the type I fail-
ure.Although such designcontrolsare important, most
equipment failuresin the fieldbear no relation tothe
resultsofreasonablestressanalysesduring design.These
failuresare type II(i.e.,those caused by built-inflaws}.
1.2 New Direction
The new direction in reliability engineering will be
toward a more realistic recognition of the causes and
effects of failures. The new boundaries proposed for relia-
bility engineering are to exclude management, applied
mathematics, and double checking. These functions are
important and may still be performed by reliability engi-
neers. However, reliability engineering is to be a synthe-
sizing function devoted to flaw control. The functions
presented in figure 2 relate to the following tasks:
(1) Identifyflaws and stressesand rank them for
priorityactions.
(2) Engage thematerialtechnologiststo determine the
flaw failuremechanisms.
(3)Develop flaw controltechniquesand send informa-
tionback to the engineersresponsiblefordesign,manu-
facture,and support planning.
Electromigration Cathode Bearing
depletfon wear
(a) Type I failures (a designmarginproblemon stress/strength,
fatigue, andwear).
Oxide
Electromigration Misaligned Oxidepinhole
aroundflaw gearwear breakdown
(b)Type II failures(a flawproblem).
Figure1.--Two typesof failure.
i t
Support
planning
I Design I=function
Design
_ package
I
Environmental __analysisfunction
Environmental
stress
information
Flaw control
information
Manufacturing _--k_nufacturing
flaw information
liiiiiiii!i i i
,r
 li iliiiiiiiiiil-
Flaw (failure)
mechanisms
I tecMaterial
hnology
Completed systems/equlpm_ent
Information on
operational
conditions
Flaw (failure)
information
System/
equipment
iser
Maintenance plan and test equipment
Figure 2.--Role of reliability engineering for the 1990's.
The types of output expected from reliability engi-
neering are different from those provided by traditional
engineering: stress-screening regimens; failure characteris-
tics of parts and systems; effects of environmental stresses
on flaws and failures; relationship of failure mechanisms
to flaw failures; relationship of manufacturing yield to
product reliability; flaw detection methods such as auto-
mated IC chip inspection and vibration signature
monitoring.
Because flaws in an item depend on the design, manu-
facturing processes, quality control, parts, and materials,
the distribution of flaws does not stay constant. Relia-
bility engineering must act in a timely manner to provide
flaw control information to the proper functions for ac-
tion. It is important that customers recognize this fact
and allow proper controls to be tailored to the needs of
the time instead of demanding a one-time negotiation of
what should be done for the total contract period.
1.3 Training as of June 1992
Although this tutorial considers only specific areas to
exemplify the contents of a reliability training program,
the following provides a complete list from the NASA
Reference Publication 1253, =Reliability Training," avail-
able upon request from the National Technical Informa-
tion Service, Springfield, Virginia; (703) 487-4650. A
course evaluation form is included in the appendix.
Introduction to Reliability
Era of Mechanical Designs
Era of Electron Tubes
Era of Semiconductors
Period of Awakening
New Direction
Concluding Remarks
Reliability Training
Relisbmty Mathematics and Failure Physics
Mathematics Review
Notation
Manipulation of Exponential Functions
Rounding Data
Integration Formulas
Differential Formulas
Partial Derivatives
Expansion of (a + b) n
Failure Physics
Probability Theory
Fundamentals
Probability Theorems
Concept of Reliability
Reliability as Probability of Success
Reliability as Absence of Failure
Product Application
K-Factors
Concluding l_marks
Reliability Training
Exponential Dlstribut|on and Rellabmty Models
Exponential Distribution
Failure Rate Definition
Failure Rate Dimensions
_Bathtub" Curve
Mean Time Between Failures
Calculations of Pc for Single Devices
Reliability Models
Calculation of Reliability for Serles-Connected Devices
Calculation of Reliability for Devices Connected in Parallel
(Redundancy)
Calculation of Reliability for Complete System
8
Concluding Remarks
Reliability Training
Uetag Failure Rate Data
Variables Affecting Failure Rates
Operating Life Test
Storage Test
Summary of Variables Affecting Failure Rates
Part Failure Rate Data
Improving System Reliability Through Part Derating
Predicting Reliability by Rapid Techniques
Use of Failure Rates in Tradeoffs
Nonoperating Failures
Applications of Reliability Predictions to Control of
Equipment Reliability
Standardisation as a Means of Reducing Failure Rates
Allocation of Failure Rates and Reliability
Importance of Learning From Each Failure
Failure Reporting, Analysis, Corrective Action, and
Concurrence
Case Study--Achieving Launch Vehicle Reliability
Design Challenge
Subsystem Description
Approach to Achieving Reliability Goals
Launch and Flight Reliability
Field Failure Problem
Mechanical Tests
Runup and Rundown Tests
Summary of Case Study
Concluding Remarks
Reliability Training
Applying Probabillty Density Functions
Probability Density Functions
Application of Density Functions
Cumulative Probability Distribution
Normal Distribution
Normal Density Function
Properties of Normal Distribution
Symmetrical Two-Limit Problems
One-Limit Problems
Nonsymmetrical Two-Limit Problems
Application of Normal Distribution to Test Analyses and
Reliability Predictions
Effects of Tolerance on a Product
Notes on Tolerance Accumulation: A How-To-Do-It Guide
Estimating Effects of Tolerance
Concluding Remarks
Reliability Training
Testing for Reliability
Demonstrating Reliability
Pc Illustrated
Ps Illustrated
Pw Illustrated
K-Factors lllustrated
Test Objectives and Methods
Test Objectives
Attribute Test Methods
Test-to-Failure Methods
Life Test Methods
Concluding Remarks
Reliability Training
Software Reliabfllty
Models
Time Domain Models
Data Domain Models
Axiomatic Models
Other Models
Trends and Conclusions
Software
Categories of Software
Processing Environments
Severity of Software Defects
Software Bugs Compared With Software Defects
Hardware and Software Failures
Manifestations of Software Bugs
Reliability Training
Software quality A_uraace
Concept of Quality
Software Quality
Software Quality Characteristics
Software Quality Metrics
Overall Software Quality Metrics
Software Quality Standards
Concluding Remarks
Reliability Training
Reliability Management
Roots of Reliability Management
Planning a Reliability Management Organisation
General Management Considerations
Program Establishment
Goals and Objectives
Symbolic Representation
Logistics Support and Repair Philosophy
Reliability Management Activities
Performance Requirements
Specification Targets
Field Studies
Human Reliability
Analysis Methods
Human Errors
Example
Presentation of Reliability
Engineering and Manufacturing
User or Customer
Reliability Training
Appendixes
A--Reliability Information
B--Project Manager's Guide on Product Assurance
C--Reliabillty Testing Examples
Bibliography
Reliability Training Answer_
2.0 RELIABILITY MATHEMATICS AND FAIL-
URE PHYSICS
2.1 FailurePhysics
When most engineersthink of reliability,they think
of parts sinceparts are the buildingblocks of products.
Allagreethat a reliableproductmust have reliableparts.
But what makes a part reliable?When asked,nearlyall
engineers would say a reliablepaxt is one purchased
according to a certain source control document and
bought from an approved vendor. Unfortunately, these
two qualifications are not always guarantees of relial)ility.
The following case illustrates this problem.
A clock purchased according to PD 4600008 was
procured from an approved vendor foruse inthe ground
support equipment ofa missilesystem and was subjected
to qualificationtestsas part of the reliabilityprogram.
These testsconsistedofhigh- and low-temperature,me-
chanicalshock,temperatureshock,vibration,and humid-
ity.The clocksfrom the then sole-sourcevendor failed
two ofthe tests:low-temperatureand humidity. A failure
analysisrevealedthatlubricantsintheclock'smechanism
frozeand that the sealswere not adequate to protectthe
mechanism from humidity. A second approved vendor
was selected.His clocksfailedthe hlgh-temperaturetest.
In the processthe dialhands and numerals turnedblack,
making readingsimpossiblefrom a distanceof 2 feet.A
third approved vendor's clocks passed all of the tests
exceptmechanical shock,which crackedtwo ofthe cases.
Ironically,the fourth approved vendor's clocks,though
lessexpensive,passed allthe tests.
The pointof thisillustrationisthat fourclocks,each
designed to the same specificationand procured from a
qualifiedvendor, allperformed differentlyin the same
environments. Why did thishappen? The specification
did not includethe gear lubricantor the type ofcoating
on the hands and numerals or the type ofcasematerial.
Many similarexamples could be cited,ranging from
requirements for glue and paint to complete assemblies
and systems, and the key to answering these problems
can best be stated as follows:To kuow how reliablea
product is or how to design a reliable product, you must
know how many ways its parts can fail and the types and
magnitude of stresses that cause such failures. Think
about this: if you knew every conceivable way a missile
could fail and if you knew the type and level of stress
required to produce each failure, you could build a missile
that would never fail because you could eliminate
(I) As many ways of failureas possible
(2) As many stressesas possible
(3)The remaining potentialfailuresby controlling
the levelofthe remaining stresses
Sound simple? Well, itwould be exceptthat despitethe
thousands of failuresobserved inindustry each day, we
stillknow very littleabout why thingsfailand even less
about how to controlthesefailures.However, through
systematicdata accumulation and study,we learnmore
each day.
As statedat the outset,thistutorialintroducessome
basic concepts of failurephysics:failuremodes (how
failuresarerevealed);failuremechanisms (what produces
the failuremode); and failurestresses(what activatesthe
failuremechanisms). The theory and the practicaltools
availablefor controllingfailuresare presentedalso.
2.2 Reliabilityas Absence ofFailure
Although the classicaldefinitionof reliabilityis
adequate for most purposes,we are going to modify it
somewhat and examine reliabilityfrom a slightlydiffer-
ent viewpoint.Consider thisdefinition:Reliabilityisthe
probability that the critical [ailuremodes ofa device wi]l
not occur during a specified period of time and under
specified conditions when used in the manner and for the
purpose _tended. Essentially,thismodificationreplaces
the words "a device willoperate successfullffwith the
words "criticalfailuremodes . . .willnot occur._ This
means that ifallthe possiblefailuremodes of a device
(ways the device can fail)and their probabilitiesof
occurrence are known, the probabilityof success(orthe
reliabilityof a device)can be stated.It can be statedin
terms ofthe probabilitythat thosefailuremodes critical
to the performance of the devicewillnot occur.Just as
we needed a cleardefinitionof successwhen using the
classicaldefinition,we must alsohave a cleardefinition
of failurewhen using the modified definition.
For example, assume that a resistorhas only two
failure modes: it can open or it can short. If the
probabilitythat the resistorwillnot short is0.99 and the
probabilitythat itwillnot open is0.9,the reliabilityof
the resistor(or the probabilitythat the resistorwillnot
shortor open) isgivenby
Rreslstor = Probability of no opens
× Probabilityof no shorts
= 0.9 × 0.99 = 0.89
Note that we have multipliedthe probabilities.Proba-
bilitytheorem 2 thereforerequiresthat the open-failure-
mode probabilityand the short-failure-modeprobability
be independent of each other.This condition issatisfied
because an open-failuremode cannot occur simultane-
ously with a shortmode.
2.3 Product Application
This sectionrelatesreliability(or the probabilityof
success)to product failures.
2.3.1 Product failuremodes.--In general, critical
equipment failuresmay be classifiedascatastrophicpart
failures,tolerance failures,and wearout failures.The
expressionforreliabilitythen becomes
R = P££w
I0
where
Pc probability that catastrophic part failures will not
occur
Pt probability that tolerance failures will not occur
Pw probability that wearout failures will not occur
As in the resistor example, these probabilities are multi-
plied together because they are considered to be indepen-
dent of each other. However, this may not always be true
because an out-of-tolerance failure, for example, may
evolve into or result from a catastrophic part failure.
Nevertheless, in this tutorial they are considered inde-
pendent and exceptions are pointed out as required.
2.3.2 Inherent product reliability.--Consider the in-
herent reliability R i of a product. Think of the expression
R i = PcPtP w as representing the potential reliability of
a product as described by its documentation, or let it
represent the reliability inherent in the design drawings
instead of the reliability of the manufactured hardware.
This inherent reliability is predicated on the decisions and
actions of many people. If they change, the inherent relia-
bility could change.
Why do we consider inherent reliability? Because the
facts of failure are these: When a design comes off the
drawing board, the parts and materials have been se-
lected; the tolerance, error, stress, and other performance
analyses have been performed; the type of packaging is
firm; the manufacturing processes and fabrication tech-
niques have been decided; and usually the test methods
and the quality acceptance criteria have been selected. At
this point the design documentation represents some po-
tential reliability that can never be increased except by a
design change or good maintenance. However, the possi-
bility exists that the actual reliability observed when the
documentation is transformed into hardware will be much
less than the potential reliability of the design. To under-
stand why this is true, consider the hardware to be a
black box with a hole in both the top and bottom. Inside
are potential failures that limit the inherent reliability of
the design. When the hardware is operated, these poten-
tial failures fall out the bottom (i.e., operating failures
are observed). The rate at which the failures fall out
depends on how the box or hardware is operated. Unfor-
tunately, we never have just the inherent failures to
worry about because other types of failures are being
added to the box through the hole in the top. These other
failures are generated by the manufacturing, quality, mad
logistics functions, by the user or customer, and even by
the reliability organization itself. We discuss these added
failures and their contributors in the following paragraphs
but it is important to understand that, because of the
added failures, the observed failures will be greater than
the inherent failures of the design.
2.4 K-Factors
The other contributorsto product failurejust men-
tionedare calledK-factors;they have a value between 0
and 1 and modify the inherentreliability:
Rproduc t = Ri(KqKmKrK_Ku)
• K-factors denote probabilities that inherent reliability
will not be degraded by
- K m manufacturing and fabricationand assembly
techniques
- quality test methods and acceptance criteria
Krqreliability engineering activities
- K_ logistics activities
K u the user or customer
• Any K-factor can cause reliabilityto go to zero.
• Ifeach K-factor equals1 (thegoal),Rproduct = R i.
2.5 Variables AffectingFailureRates
Part failure rates are affected by (1) acceptance cri-
teria, (2) all environments, (3) application, and (4) stor-
age. To reduce the occurrence of part failures, we observe
failure modes, learn what caused the failure (the failure
stress), determine why it failed (the failure mechanism),
and then take action to eliminate the failure. For exam-
ple, one of the failure modes observed during a storage
test was an _open" in a wet tantalum capacitor. The fail-
ure mechanism was end seal deterioration, allowing the
electrolyte to leak. One obvious way to avoid this failure
mode in a system that must be stored for long periods
without maintenance is not to use wet tantalum capaci-
tors. If this is impossible, the best solution would be to
redesign the end seals. Further testing would be required
to isolate the exact failure stress that produces the failure
mechanism. Once isolated, the failure mechanism can
often be eliminated through redesign or additional process
controls.
2.6 Use of Failure Rates in Tradeoffs
Failure rate tables and derating curves are useful to a
designer because they enable him to make reliability
tradeoffs and provide a more practical method of estab-
lishing derating requirements. For example, suppose we
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have two design conceptsfor performing some function.
If the failurerate of concept A is 10 times higher than
that of concept]3,one can expect concept B to failone-
tenth as often as concept A. If it is desirableto use
concept A forother reasons,such as cost,size,perform-
ance, or weight, the derating failurerate curves can be
used to improve concept A's failurerate (e.g.,select
components with a lower failurerate,deratethe compo-
nents more, orboth).An even betterapproach isto find
ways to reduce the complexity and thus the failurerate
of concept A. Figure 3 illustratesthe use of failurerate
data in tradeoffs.This figuregivesa failure-rate-versus-
temperature curve for the electronicsof a complex (over
35 000 parts)pieceof ground support equipment. The
curve was developed as follows:
(1) A failureratepredictionwas performed by using
component failureratesand theirapplicationfactorsK A
foran operatingtemperature of25 oC. The resultingfail-
ure ratewas chosen as a referencepoint.
(2) Predictionswere then made by using the same
method for temperatures of 50, 75, and 100 °C. The
ratiosof these predictionsto the referencepoint were
plotted versus component operating temperature, with
the resultingcurve for the equipment. This curve was
then used to provide tradeoff criteriafor using air-
conditioningversus blowers to cool the equipment. To
illustrate,suppose the maximum operatingtemperatures
expected are 50 °C with air-conditioningand 75 °C with
blowers.Suppose furtherthatthe requiredfailureratefor
the equipment, ifthe equipment isto meet itsreliability
goal,isone failureper 50 hr.A failureratepredictionat
25 °C might indicatea failurerateofI per 100 hr.From
the figure,note that the maximum allowableoperating
temperature is therefore60 °C, since the maximum
allowablefailurerateratioisA = 2;that is,at60 °C the
equipment failureratewillbe (1/100) × 2 = 1/50,which
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isthe requiredfailurerate.Ifblowersareused forcooling,
the equipment must operateat temperatures as high as
75 °C; ifair-conditioningisused,the temperature need
not exceed 50 °C. Therefore,air-conditioningmust be
used ifwe are to meet the reliabilityrequirement.
Other factorsmust be examined before we make a
finaldecision.Whatever type of cooling equipment is
selected,the totalsystem reliabilitynow becomes
R T = ReR c
Therefore,the effecton the system ofthe coolingequip
ment's reliabilitymust be calculated.A more important
considerationisthe effecton system reliabilityshould the
cooling equipment fail.Because temperature control
appears to be critical,lossof itmay have serioussystem
consequences.Therefore,itistoo soon toruleout blowers
entirely.A failuremode, effects,and criticalityanalysis
(FMECA) must be made on both cooling methods to
examine allpossiblefailuremodes and theireffectson the
system. Only then willwe have sufficientinformation to
make a sound decision.
2.7 Importance ofLearning From Each Failure
When a product fails, a valuable piece of information
about it has been generated because we have the
opportunity to learn how to improve the product if we
take the rightactions.
Failurescan be classifiedas:
(1) Catastrophic (a shorted transistoror an open
wire-wound resistor)
(2)Degradation (changeintransistorgain or the re-
sistorvalue)
(3)Wearout (brushwear in an electricmotor)
These threefailurecategoriescan be subclassifiedfurther:
(1) Independent (a shorted capacitor in a radiofre-
quency amplifier being unrelated to a low-emission
cathode in a picture tube)
(2) Cascade (the shorted capacitor in the radiofre-
quency amplifier causing excessive current to flow in
its transistor and burning the collector beam lead
open)
(3) Common mode (uncured resin being present in
motors)
Much can be learnedfrom each failureby using these
categories,good failurereporting,analysis,and a concur-
rence system and by taking correctiveaction.Failure
analysisdetermines what caused the part to fail.Correc-
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tive action ensures that the cause is dealt with. Concur-
rence informs management of actions being taken to
avoid another failure.These data enable all personnel to
compare the part ratings with the use stresses and verify
that the part isbeing used with a known margin.
2.8 Effects of Tolerance on a Product
Because tolerances must be expected in all manufac-
turing processes, some important questions to ask about
the affectsof tolerance on a product are
(1) How is the reliability affected?
(2) How can tolerances he analyzed and what methods
are available?
provide some measure of reliabilitybut littleinformation
about the population failure mechanisms of like devices.
(The exceptions to this are not dealt with at this time.)
In subsequent sections, we discuss confidence levels,
attribute test, test-to-failure, and lifetest methods,
explain how wel these methods meet the two test objec-
tives, show how the test results can be statistically
analyzed, and introduce the subject and use of confidence
limits.
3.2 Confidence Levels
Mr. Igor Bazovsky, in his book, Reliability Theory
and Practice (ref.4), defines the term aconfidence_ in
testing:
(3) What will affect the term Pt in the product We know thatstatisticalestimatesare more likelyto be close
reliabilitymodel? to the truevalueas the sample sizeincreases.Thus, thereisa close
correlationbetween the accuracy ofan estimateand the sizeofthe
mample from which itwas obtained.Only an infinitelylargesample
Electrical circuits are often affected by part tolerances size could give us a 100 percent confidence or certainty that a
(circuit gains can shift up or down, and transfer function measured statistical parameter coincides with the true value. In
poles or zeros can shift into the righthand s-plane,
causing oscillations).Mechanical components may not fit
together or may be so loose that excessive vibration
causes trouble (refs.1 to 3).
3.0 TESTING FOR RELIABILITY
3.1 Test Objectives
It can be inferred that i000 testsamples are required
to demonstrate a reliabilityrequirement of 0.999. Because
of cost and time, this approach is impractical. Further-
more, the total production of a product often may not
even approach 1000 items. Because we usually cannot test
the total production of a product (calledproduct popula-
tion),we must demonstrate reliabilityon a few samples.
Thus, the main objective of a reliabilitytestis to test an
available device so that the data will allow a statistical
conclusion to be reached about the reliabilityof similar
devices that will not or cannot be tested. That is, the
main objective of a reliabilitytest isnot only to evaluate
the specificitems tested but also to provide a sound basis
for predicting the reliabilityof similar items that willnot
be tested and that often have not yet been manufactured.
To know how reliable a product is one must know
how many ways itcan failand the types and magnitudes
of the stresses that produce such failures.This premise
leads to a secondary objective of a reliabilitytest: to
produce failures in the product so that the types and
magnitudes of the stresses causing such failures can be
identified. Reliability tests that result in no failures
this context, confidence is a mathematical probability relating the
mutual positions of the true value of a parameter and its estimate.
When the estimate of a parameter is obtained from a reason-
ably sized sample, we may logically assume that the true value of
that parameter will be somewhere in the neighborhood of the
estimate, to the right or to the left, Therefore, it would be more
meaningful to express statistical estimates in terms of a range or
interval with an associated probability or confidence that the true
value lies within such interval than to express them as point
estimates. This is exactly what we are doing when we assign
confidence limits to point estimates obtained from statistical
measurements.
In other words, rather than express statisticalestimates
as point estimates, it would be more meaningful to
express them as a range (or interval),with an associated
probability (or confidence) that the true value lleswithin
such an interval. Confidence is a statisticalterm that
depends on supporting data and reflects the amount of
risk to be taken when stating the reliability.
3.3 Attribute Test Methods
Qualification, preflight certification,and design verifi-
cation tests are categorized as attribute tests (refs.5
and 6). They are usually go/no-go and demonstrate that
a device is good or bad without showing how good or
how bad. In a typical test, two samples are subjected to
a selected level of environmental stress,usually tilemaxi-
mum anticipated operational limit.Ifboth samples pass,
the device is considered qualified, preflight certified,or
verified for use in the particular environment involved
(refs.7 and 8). Occasionally, such tests are called teststo
13
success because the true objective is to have the device
pass the test.
In summary, an attribute test is not a satisfactory
method of testing for reliability because it can only iden-
tify gross design and manufacturing problems; it is an
adequate method of testing for reliability only when suffi-
cient samples are tested to establish an acceptable level
of statistical confidence.
3.4 Test-To-Failure Methods
The purpose of the test-to-failure method is to develop
a failure distribution for a product under one or more
types of stress. The results are used to calculate the
demonstrated reliability of the device for each stress. In
this case the demonstrated population reliability will usu-
ally be the Pt or Pw product reliability term.
In this discussion of test-to-failure methods, the term
=safety factor s SF is included because it is often confused
with safety margin SM. Safety factor is widely used in
industry to describe the assurance against failure that is
built into structural products. Of the many definitions of
safety factor the most commonly used is the ratio of
mean strength to reliability boundary:
When we deal with materials with clearly defined,
repeatable, and =tight _ strength distributions, such as
sheet and structural steel or aluminum, using SF presents
little risk. However, when we deal with plastics, fiber-
glass, and other metal substitutes or processes with wide
variations in strength or repeatability, using SM provides
a clearer picture of what is happening (fig. 4). In most
cases, we must know the safety margin to understand
how accurate the safety factor may be.
In summary, test-to-failure methods can be used to
develop a strength distribution that provides a good esti-
mate of the Pt and Pw product reliability terms without
the need for the large samples required for attribute tests;
the results of a test-to-failure exposure of a device can be
used to predict the reliability of similar devices that can-
not or will not be tested; testing to failure provides a
means of evaluating the failure modes and mechanisms of
devices so that improvements can be made; confidence
levels can be applied to the safety margins and to the
resulting population reliability estimates; the accuracy of
a safety factor can be known only if the associated safety
margin is known.
3.5 Life Test Methods
Lifetestsaxe conducted to illustratehow the failure
rateofa typicalsystem orcomplex subsystem variesdur-
ing itsoperatinglife.Such data providevaluable guide-
linesfor controllingproduct reliability.They help to
establishburn-in requirements, to predict spare part
requirements,and to understand the need for or lack of
need for a system overhaul program. Such data are ob-
tained through laboratorylifetestsor from the normal
operation ofa fieldedsystem.
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In summary, Iliatests are performed to evaluate
product failureratecharacteristics;iffailuresincludeall
causesof system failure,the failurerate of the system is
the only truefactoravailableforevaluatingthe system's
performance; lifetestsat the part level requirelarge
sample sizesifrealisticfailurerate characteristicsare to
be identified;laboratory lifetests must simulate the
major factorsthat influencefailurerates in a device
during fieldoperations;the use ofrunning averagesinthe
analysisof lifedata will identifyburn-in and wearout
regionsifsuch exist;and failurerates are statisticsand
thereforeare subjectto confidencelevelswhen used in
making predictions.
Figure 5 illustrateswhat might be called a failure
surfacefor a typicalproduct. Itshows system failurerate
versus operating time and environmental stress,three
parameters that describea surfacesuch that, given an
environmental stressand an operating time, the failure
rateisa point on the surface.
Test-to-failuremethods generate lineson the surface
parallelto the stressaxis;lifetestsgeneratelineson the
surfaceparallelto the time axis.Therefore,these tests
provide a good descriptionof the failuresurfaceand,
consequently,the reliabilityofa product.
Attributetestsresultonly in a point on the surfaceif
failuresoccur and a point somewhere within the volume
iffailuresdo not occur.For thisreason,attributetesting
isthe leastdesirablemethod forascertainingreliability.
/0 0
Figure 5.--Product failure surface.
Of course, in the case of missile flights or other events
that produce go/no-go results, an attribute analysis is the
only way to determine product reliability.
4.0 SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Software reliability management is highly dependent
on how the relationship between quality and reliability is
perceived. For the purposes of this tutorial, quality is
closely related to the process, and reliability is closely
related to the product. Thus, both span the life cycle.
Before we can stratify software reliability, the progress
of hardware reliability will be reviewed. Over the past
25 years, the industry observed (1) the initial assignment
of "wizard status _ to hardware reliability for theory,
modeling, and analysis, (2) the growth of the field, and
(3) the final establishment of hardware reliability as a
science. One of the major problems was aligning
reliability predictions and field performance. Once that
was accomplished, the wizard status was removed from
hardware reliability. The emphasis in hardware reliabil-
ity from now to the year 2000 will be on system failure
modes and effects.
Software reliability became classified as a science for
many reasons. The difficulty in assessing software
reliability is analogous to the problem of assessing the
reliability of a new hardware device with unknown
reliability characteristics. The existence of 30 to 50
different software reliability models indicates the
organization in this area. Hardware reliability began at
a few companies and later became the focus of the
Advisory Group on Reliability of Electronic Equipment.
The field then logically progressed through different
models in sequence over the years. Similarly, numerous
people and companies simultaneously entered the soft-
ware reliability field in their major areas: cost, complex-
ity, and reliability. The difference is that at least 100
times as many people are now studying software reliabil-
ity as those who initially studied hardware reliability.
The existence of so many models and their purports tends
to mask the fact that several of these models showed
excellent correlations between software performance pre-
dictions and actual software field performance: the Musa
model as applied to communications systems and the
Xerox model as applied to office copiers. There are also
reasons for not accepting software reliability as a science,
and they are discussed next.
One impediment to the establishment of software
reliability as a science is the tendency toward program-
ming development philosophies such as (1) "do it right
the in'st time _ (a reliability model is not needed} or
(2) "quality is a programmer's development toolj _ or
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(3) _quality is the same as reliability and is measured by
the number of defects in a program and not by its
reliability. _ All of these philosophies tend to eliminate
probabilistic measures because the managers consider a
programmer to be a software factory whose quMity
output is controllable, adjustable, or both. In actuality,
hardware design can be controlled for reliability
characteristics better than software design can. Design
philosophy experiments that failed to enhance hardware
reliability axe again being formulated for software design
(ref. 9). Quality and reliability are not the same. Quality
is characteristic and reliability is probabilistic. Our
approach draws the line between quality and reliability
because quality is concerned with the development
process and reliability is concerned with the operating
product. Many models have been developed and a num-
ber of the measurement models show great promise. Pre-
dictive models have been far less successful partly because
a data base {such as MIL-HDBK-217E, ref. 10} is not
yet available for software. Software reliability often has
to use other methods; it must be concerned with the proc-
ess of software product development.
4.1 Hardware and Software Failures
Microprocessor-based products have more refined defi-
nitions. Four types of failure may be considered (1} hard-
ware catastrophic, (2)hardware transient, (3)software
catastrophic, and (4) software transient. In general, the
catastrophic failures require a physical or remote hard-
ware replacement, a manual or remote unit restart, or a
software program patch. The transient failure categories
can result in either restarts or reloads for the
microprocessor-based systems, subsystems, or individual
units and may or may not require further correction. A
recent reliability analysis of such a system assigned ratios
for these categories. Hardware transient faults were
assumed to occur at 10 times the hardware catastrophic
rate, and software transient faults were assumed to occur
at 100 to 500 times the software catastrophic rate.
The time of day is of great concern in reliability
modeling and analysis.Although hardware catastrophic
failuresoccur at any time oftheday, they oftenmanifest
themselvesduring busiersystemprocessingtimes.On the
otherhand, hardware and softwaretransientfailuresgen-
erallyoccurduring the busy hours.When a system'spre-
dicted reliabilityis closeto the specifiedreliability,a
sensitivityanalysismust be performed.
4.2 Manifestations of Software Bugs
Many theories, models, and methods are available for
quantifying software reliability. Nathan (ref. 11) stated,
"It is contrary to the definition of reliability to apply
reliability analysis to a system that never really works.
This means that the software which still has bugs in it
really has never worked in the true sense of reliability in
the hardware sense. _ Large complex software programs
used in the communications industry are usually operat-
ing with some software bugs. Thus, a reliability analysis
of such software is different from a reliability analysis of
established hardware. Software reliability is not alone in
the need for establishing qualitative and quantitative
models.
In the early 1980's,work was done on a combined
hardware/software reliabilitymodel. A theory for com-
bining well-known hardware and software models in a
Markov processwas developed.A considerationwas the
topicofsoftware bugs and errorsbased on experiencein
the telecommunicationsfield.To synthesizethe manifes-
tationsofsoftwarebugs, some ofthe followinghardware
trends for these systems should be noted: (1)hardware
transientfailuresincreaseas integratedcircuitsbecome
denser; (2} hardware transientfailurestend to remain
constant or increaseslightlywith time afterthe burn-in;
and (3} hardware (integrated circuit) catastrophic failures
decrease with time after the burn-in phase. These trends
affect the operational software of communications sys-
tems. If the transient failures increase, the error analysis
and system security software are called into action more
often. This increases the risk of misprocessing a given
transaction in the communications system. A decrease in
the catastrophic failure rate of integrated circuits can be
significant {ref. 12}. An order-of-magnitude decrease in
the failure rate of 4K memory devices between the first
year and the twentieth year is predicted. We also tend to
oversimplify the actual situations. Even with five vendors
of these 4K devices, the manufacturing quality control
person may have to set up different screens to eliminate
the defective devices from different vendors. Thus, the
system software will see many different transient memory
problems and combinations of them in operation.
Centralcontroltechnologyhas prevailedincommuni-
cationssystems for25 years.The industryhas used many
of itsold modeling toolsand applied them directlyto
distributedcontrolstructures.Most modeling research
was performed on largeduplex processors.With an evolu-
tion through forms of multiple duplex processorsand
load-sharingprocessorsand on to the presentforms of
distributedprocessingarchitectures,the modeling tools
need to be verified.With fullydistributedcontrolsys-
tems, thesoftwarereliabilitymodel must be conceptually
matched to the softwaredesign in orderto achievevalid
predictionsofreliability.
The followingtrendscan be formulated for software
transientfailures:(I}softwaretransientfailuresdecrease
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as the system architecture approaches a fully distributed
control structure, and (2) software transient failures
increase as the processing window decreases (i.e., less time
allowed per function, fast timing mode entry, removal of
error checking, removal of system ready checks).
A fullydistributed control structure can be configured
to operate as its own error filter.In a hierarchy of proc-
essing levels, each level acts as a barrier to the level
below and prevents errorsor transient faultsfrom propa-
gating through the system. Central control structures
cannot usually prevent this type of error propagation.
If the interleaving of transaction processes in a soft-
ware program is reduced, such as with a fully distributed
control architecture, the transaction processes are less
likely to fail. This is especially true with nonconslstent
user interaction as experienced in communications sys-
tems. Another opinion on software transient failures is
that the faster a software program runs, the more likely
it is to cause errors (such as encountered in central
control architectures}.
A "missing link" needs further discussion. Several
methods can be used to quantify the occurrence of soft-
ware bugs. However, manifestations in the system's oper-
ations are detrimental to the reliability analysis because
each manifestation could cause a failure event. The key
is to categorize levels of criticality for bug manifestations
and estimate their probability of occurrence and their re-
spective distributions. The importance of this increases
with the distribution of the hardware and software. Soft-
ware reliability is often controlled by establishing a soft-
ware reliability design process. The final measure is the
system test, which includes the evaluation of priority
problems and the performance of the system while under
stress as defined by audits, interrupts, re-lnitializatlon,
and other measurable parameters. The missing link in
quantifying software bug manifestations needs to be
found before we can obtain an accurate software reliabil-
ity model for measuring tradeoffs in the design process on
a predicted performance basis. If a software reliability
modeling tool could additionally combine the effects of
hardware, software, and operator faults, it would be a
powerful tool for making design tradeoff decisions.
Table I, an example of the missing link, presents a five-
levelcriticalityindex for defects.These examples indicate
the flexibility of such an approach to criticality
classification.
We can choose a decreasing, constant, or increasing
software bug removal rate for systems software. Although
each has its app]icatlon to special situations and systems,
a decreasing software bug removal rate will generally be
encountered. Systems software also has advantages in
that certain software defects can be temporarily patched
and the permanent patch postponed to a more appropri-
ate date. Thus, this type of defect manifestation is
treated in genera] as one that does not affect service, but
it should be included in the overall software quality
assessment. The missing link concerns software bug mani-
festations. Until the traditional separation of hardware
and software systems is overcome in the design of large
systems, it will be impossible to achieve a satisfactory
performance benchmark. This indicates that software per-
formance modeling has not yet focused on the specific
causes of software unreliability.
4.3 Concept of Quality
Consider the concept of quality before We go on to
software quality. The need for quality is universal. The
concepts of _zero defects" and "doing it right the first
time" have changed our perspective on quality manage-
ment. We changed from measuring defects per unit and
acceptable quality levels to monitoring the design and
cost reduction processes. The present concepts indicate
that quality is not free. One viewpoint is that a major
improvement in quality can be achieved by perfecting the
process of developing a product. Thus, we would charac-
terize the process, implement factors to achieve customer
satisfaction, correct defects as soon as possible, and then
strive for total quality management. The key to achieving
TABLE I.--CRITICALITY INDEX
Bug
manifestation
rate
4 per day
3 per day
2 per week
1 per month
1 per two
years
Defect
removal
rate
1 per month
1 per week
1 per month
2 per year
1 per year
Level of
criticality
Failure type
Transient
Transient
Transient or
catastrophic
Transient or
catastrophic
Catastrophic
Failure
characteristic
Errors come and go
Errors are repeated
Service is affected
System is partially
down
System stops
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qualityappears to have a thirdmajor factorin addition
toproduct and process:the environment. People are im-
portant.They make the processor theproduct successful.
The next step isto discusswhat the processofachiev-
ing qualityinsoftwareconsistsof and how qualityman-
agement isinvolved.The purpose ofqualitymanagement
for programming products isto ensure that a preselected
softwarequalitylevelhas been achieved on scheduleand
in a cost-effectivemanner. In developinga qualityman-
agement system,the programming product'scriticalife-
cycle-phasereviewsprovidethe referencebase fortracking
the achievement of qualityobjectives.The International
ElectrotechnicalCommission (IEC) system life-cycle
phases presented intheirguidelinesfor reliabilityand
maintainabilitymanagement are (I)concept and defini-
tion, (2)design and development, (3) manufacturing,
installation,and acceptance, (4)operation and main-
tenance,and (5)disposal.
In general,a phase-coststudy shows the increasing
costofcorrectingprogramming defectsinlaterphasesof
a programming product'slife.Also, the higher the level
ofsoftwarequality,the more life-cyclecostsare reduced.
4.4 Software Quality
The next step is to look at specific software quality
items. Software quality is defined as %he achievement of
a preselected software quality level within the costs,
schedule, and productivity boundaries established by
management _ (ref. 10}. However, agreement on such a
definition is often difficult to achieve because metrics
vary more than those for hardware, software reliability
management has focused on the product, and software
quality management has focused on the process. In prac-
tice, the quality emphasis can change with respect to the
specific product application environment. Different per-
spectives of software product quality have been presented
over the years. However, in todays' literature there is
general agreement that the proper quality level for a par-
ticular software product should be determined in the con-
cept and definition phase and that quality managers
should monitor the project during the remaining life-cycle
phases to ensure the proper quality level.
The developer of a methodology for assessing the qual-
ity of a software product must respond to the specific
characteristics of the product. There can be no single
quality metric. The process of assessing the quality of a
software product begins with the selection of specific
characteristics, quality metrics, and performance criteria.
With respect to software quality, several areas of
interest are (1) characteristics, (2) metrics, (3) overall
metrics, and (4) standards. Areas {1} and (2) are applica-
ble during both the design and development phase and
the operation and maintenance phase. In general, area (2)
is used during the design and development phase before
the acceptance phase for a given software product. The
following discussion will concern area (2).
4.5 Software Quality Metrics
The entirearea ofsoftwaremeasurements and metrics
has been widely discussedand the subjectofmany publi-
cations. Notable is the guide for software reliability
measurement developedby theInstituteforElectricaland
ElectronicsEngineers (IEEE} Computer Society'sworking
group on metrics.A basisforsoftwarequalitystandardi-
zationwas alsoissuedby the IEEE. Software metricscan-
not be developed beforethe cause and effectof a defect
have been establishedfora givenproduct with relationto
itsproduct lifecycle.A typicalcause-and-effectchartfor
a softwareproduct includesthe processindicator.At the
testingstage of product development, the evolution of
softwarequalitylevelscan be assessedby characteristics
such as freedom from error,successfultestcase comple-
tion,and estimate of the software bugs remaining. For
example, these processindicatorscan be used to predict
slippageofthe product deliverydate and the inabilityto
meet originaldesigngoals.
When the programming product entersthe qualifica-
tion,installation,and acceptance phase and continues
into the maintenance and enhancements phase,the con-
cept of performance isimportant in the qualitycharac-
teristicactivity.This concept isshown in table IIwhere
the 5 IEC system life-cyclephaseshave been expanded to
10 softwarelife-cyclephases.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This sectionpresented a snapshot ofsoftware quality
assurancetoday. Continuing researchisconcerned with
theuse ofoverallsoftwarequalitymetricsand bettersoft-
ware predictiontoolsfordetermining the defectpopula-
tion.In addition,simulators and code generators are
being furtherdeveloped sothathigh-qualitysoftwarecan
be produced.
Process indicatorsare closelyrelated to software
qualityand some include them as a stage in software
development. In general,such measures as (1) testcases
completed versus testcasesplanned and (2) the number
of linesof code developed versus the number expected
give an indicationof the overallcompany or corporate
progress toward a qualitysoftware product. Too often,
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TABLE II.--MEASUREMENTS AND PROGRAMMING PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
[The 5 International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) life-cycle phases have been expanded to I0
software phases.]
System life-
cycle phase
Software
life-cycle phase
Order of precedence
Primary Secondary
Concept and Conceptual planning (1) .........................................................
definition Requirements definition (2) .........................................................
Product definition (3) Quality metrics" ............................
Design and Top-level design (4) Quality metrics Process indicatorJ
development Detailed design (5) Quality metrics Process indicators
Implementation (6) Process Indicators b Quality metrics
w
Manufacturing Testing and integration (7) Process indicators Performance measures
and installation Qualification, installation, Performance measures c Quality metrics
and acceptance (8)
Operation and Maintenance and Performance measures ............................
maintenance enhancements (9)
Disposal Disposal (10) .........................................................
LMetrlcs, qualitative assessment, quantitative prediction, or both.
blndicators, month-by-month tracking of key proiect parameters.
¢Measures, quantitative performance assessment.
personnel are moved from one project to another and
thus the lagging projects improve but the leading projects
decline in their process indicators. The llfe cycle for
programming products should not be disrupted.
Performance measures,includingsuch criterias the
percentage ofproper transactions,the number ofsystem
restarts, the number of system reloads, and the
percentageofuptime,shouldreflecthe user'sviewpoint.
In general,the determination of applicablequality
measures for a given software product development is
viewed as a specifictaskofthesoftwarequalityassurance
function.The determinationofthe processindicatorsand
performance measures isa task of the software quality
standards function.
5.0 RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT
To design for successfulreliabilityand continue to
provide customers with a reliableproduct, the following
steps are necessary:
(1)Determine the reliabilitygoalsto be met.
(2) Construct a symbolic representation.
(3) Determine the logisticssupport and repair
philosophy.
(4) Selectthe reliabilityanalysisprocedure.
(5)Selectthe data sourcesforfailureratesand repair
rates.
(6) Determine the failureratesand the repairrates.
(7) Perform the necessarycalculations.
(8) Validate and verify the reliability.
(9) Measure reliability until customer shipment.
5.1 Goals and Objectives
Goals must be placed into the proper perspective.
Because they are often examined by using models that
the producer develops,one of the weakest linksin the
reliabilityprocessisthe modeling. Dr. John D. Spragins,
an editorfor the IEEE Transaction on Computers, cor-
roboratesthisfactwith the followingstatement (ref.13):
Some standard definitions of reliability or availability, such as
those based on the probability that all components of a system are
operational at a given time, can be dismissed as irrelevant when
studying large telecommunication networks, Many telecommunica-
tion networks are so large that the probability they are operational
according to this criterion may be very nearly zero; at least one
item of equipment may be down essentially all of the time. The
typical user, however, does not see this unless he or she happens to
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be the unlucky person whose equipment fails;the system may still
operate perfectly from thisuser's point of view. A more meaningful
criterion is one based on the reliabilityseen by typical system
users. The reliability apparent to system operators is another valid,
but distinct, criterion. (Since system operators commonly consider
systems down only after failures have been reported to them, and
may not hear of short self-clearing outages, their estimates of
reliability are often higher than the values seen by users.)
Reliability objectives can be defined differently for
various systems. An example from the telecommunica-
tions industry (ref. 14) is presented in table III.
5.2 Specification Targets
A system can have a detailed performance or relia-
bility specification that is based on customer require-
ments. The survivability of a telecommunications
network is defined as the ability of the network to
perform under stress caused by cable cuts or sudden and
lengthy traffic overloads and after failures including
equipment breakdowns. Thus, performance and availabil-
ity have been combined into a unified metric. One area
of telecommunications where these principles have been
applied is the design and implementation of fiber-based
networks. Roohy-Laleh et al. (ref. 15) state a...the statis-
tical observation that on the average 56 percent of the
pairs in a copper cable are cut when the cable is dug up,
makes the copper network 'structurally survivable. TM On
the other hand, a fiber network can be assumed to be an
all or nothing situation with 100 percent of the circuits
being affected by a cable cut, failure, etc. In this case
study (ref. 15), =...cross connects and allocatable capacity
axe utilized by the intelligent network operation system
to dynamically reconfigure the network in the case of fail-
uresY Figure 6 (from ref. 16) presents a concept for speci-
fication targets.
5.3 Human Reliability
The major objectivesofreliabilitymanagement areto
ensure that a selectedreliabilitylevelfor a product can
be achieved on schedulein a cost-effectivemanner and
that the customer perceivesthe selectedreliabilitylevel.
The currentemphasis in reliabilitymanagement ison
meeting orexceedingcustomer expectations.We can view
thisas a challenge,but itshould be viewed as the bridge
between the user and the producer or provider. This
bridge isactually =human reliability._ In the past, the
producerwas concerned with the processand the product
and found reliabilitymeasurements that addressed both.
Often therewas no correlationbetween fielddata, the
customer's perceptionof reliability,and the producer's
reliabilitymetrics.Surveys then began to indicatethat
the customer distinguishedbetween reliabilityperform-
ance, response to order placement, technicalsupport,
servicequality,etc.
Human reliabilityis defined (ref.17) as %..the
probabilityof accomplishinga job ortask successfullyby
humans atany requiredstageinsystem operationswithin
a specifiedminimum time limit(ifthe time requirement
isspecified)."Although customers generallyaxe not yet
requiringhuman reliabilitymodels in addition to the
requestedhardware and software reliabilitymodels, the
scienceof human reliabilityiswellestablished.
5.4 Customer
Reliability growth has been studied, modeled, and
analyzed--usually from the design and development
viewpoint. Seldom is the process or product studied from
the customer's perspective. Furthermore, the reliability
that the first customer observes with the r-st shipment
TABLE III.--RELIABILITY OB3ECTIVES FOR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Module or system Objective
Telephone instrument
Electronic key system
PABX
Traffic service
position system (TSPS)
Class 5 office
Class 4 office
Class 3 office
Mean time between failures
Complete loss of service
Major loss of service
Minor loss of service
Complete loss of service
Major loss of service
Minor loss of service
Mishandled calls
Mishandled calls
System outage
System outage
Loss of service
Service degradation
lOO
P2
i
E Pl
I11
Subliminal
availability
major
Fullyoperational
Subliminal
availability
minor
Unusable
Degraded
operation
Subliminalperformance,
75 percent at toad
factor B
Subliminal performance,
65 percent at load
factor B
a 1
Availability, percent
Figure 6.--Specification targets (ref. 16).
a2 100
2O
can be quitedifferentfrom thereliabilitythata customer
willobservewith a unit orsystem produced 5 yearslater,
orwith the lastshipment. Because the customer'sexperi-
ence can vary with the maturity of a system, reliability
growth isan important concepttocustomers and should
be consideredintheirpurchasingdecisions.
One key to reliability growth is the ability to def'me
the goals for the product or service from the customer's
perspective while reflecting the actual situation in which
the customer obtains the product or service. For large
telecommunications switching systems, the rule of thumb
for determining reliability growth has been that often sys-
tems have been allowed to operate at a lower availability
than the specifiedavailabilitygoalforthe first6 months
to 1 year of operation (ref.18).In addition,component
part replacement rates have often been allowed to be
50 percenthigherthan specifiedforthe first6 months of
operation.These allowancesaccommodated craftspersons
learningpatterns,software patches,design errors,etc.
Another key to reliabilitygrowth is to have its
measurement encompass the entirelifecycleof the pro-
duct.The concept isnot new; only here the emphasis is
placedon the customer'sperspective.
Reliabilitygrowth can be specifiedfrom "day 1_ in
product development and can be measured or controlled
with a 10-yearlifeuntil_day 5000._ We can apply the
philosophyofreliabilityknowledge generationprinciples,
which isto generatereliabilityknowledge at the earliest
possibletime in the planning processand to add to this
base for the duration of the product's usefullife.To
accuratelymeasure and controlreliabilitygrowth, we
must examine the entiremanufacturing lifecycle.One
method is the constructionof a production life-cycle
reliabilitygrowth chart.
In certainlargetelecommunications systems,the long
installationtime allowsthe electronicpart reliabilityto
grow so that the customer observesboth the design and
the productiongrowth.Large complex systems oftenoffer
an environment unique to each product installation,
which dictatesthat a significantreliabilitygrowth will
occur.Yet, with the differencethat sizeand complexity
impose on resultantproduct reliabilitygrowth, corpora-
tionswith largeproduct linesshould not presentoverall
reliabilitygrowth curves on a corporatebasisbut must
presentindividualproduct-linereliabilitygrowth pictures
to achievetotalcustomer satisfaction.
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APPENDIX--COURSE EVALUATION
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NASA SAFETY TRAINING CENTER (NSTC) COURSE EVALUATION
Name: Course Title:
Sponsor: Grade: (academic course only)
I.What were the strengthsof thiscourse/workshop?
I Date:
2.What were the weaknesses of thiscourse/workshop?
3.How willthe skills/knowledgeyou gained in thiscourse/workshop help you to perform betterin your job?
4.Please give the course/workshop an overallrating.
5 4 3 2 I
Excellent Fair Poor
5.Please give the instructoran overallrating.
5 4 3 2 1
Excellent Fair Poor
6. Please rate the applicability of this course to your work.
5 4 3 2 1
Excellent Fair Poor
(OVER)
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7.Asacustomer of the NASA SafetyTraining Center (NSTC), how would you rateour services?
5 4 3 2 I
Excellent Fair Poor
Comments:
8.Pleaserate the followingitems:
Excellent Fair Poor
I.Overallcoursecontent ............................ 5 4 3
2.Achievement ofcourseobjectives ..................... 5 4 3
3.Instructor'sknowledge of subject ..................... 5 4 3
4.Instructor'spresentationmethods .................... 5 4 3
5.Instructor'sabilityto addressquestions ................ 5 4 $
6. Quality of textbook/workbook (if applicable} ............ 5 4 3
7. Training facilities ............................... 5 4 3
8.Time allottedforthe course ........................ 5 4 3
Comments:
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 1
9. Training expense other than tuition(ifapplicable}:
Travel {includingplane fare,taxi,car rentaland tolls}
Per Diem
Total
10. Pleasesend thisevaluationto:
NASA SafetyTraining Center
Webb, Murray & Associates,Inc.
1730 NASA Road One, Suite 102
Houston, Texas 77058
THANK YOU_
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